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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
Anabel Zahner, Donna Claypoole, and Connie Sanner 
each applied for Medicaid institutional care coverage shortly 
after purchasing a short-term annuity.  The Pennsylvania 
Department of Human Services (“DHS”), formerly the 
Department of Welfare, classified each of their annuities as a 
resource when determining Medicaid eligibility.1  This 
classification meant that the value of each annuity precluded 
them from receiving Medicaid assistance and resulted in a 
penalty period of ineligibility.  Each plaintiff responded by 
bringing an action against DHS.  The District Court held that 
the plaintiffs’ purchases of the short-term annuities were 
sham transactions intended only to shield resources from 
Medicaid calculations, and affirmed DHS’s imposition of a 
period of Medicaid ineligibility.  The District Court also held 
that, contrary to DHS’s arguments, a Pennsylvania statute that 
purported to make all annuities assignable was preempted by 
federal law.  This appeal followed. 
 
We agree with the District Court’s preemption 
analysis, but will reverse its ruling that the annuities are 
resources for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
                                              
1 The named plaintiff, Anabel Zahner, is deceased.  
Her claim is moot and she is no longer a party.  
 
Although the life insurance and annuity company, 
ELCO Mutual Life and Annuity (“ELCO”), refers to these 
contracts as annuities, DHS argues that they do not qualify as 
annuities under statutes and regulations governing Medicaid.  
We therefore must decide whether these contracts are 
annuities for purposes of Medicaid eligibility.  For the sake of 
convenience and simplicity we will refer to them as annuities 
throughout our discussion.  Our use of that term does not 
influence or determine our analysis. 
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Donna Claypoole was admitted to a nursing home in 
December 2010; her husband remained in their home (a 
“community spouse”).  In 2009 and 2010, Claypoole and her 
husband made gifts to family members totaling over 
$100,000, resulting in a period of Medicaid ineligibility.  In 
August 2011, Claypoole’s husband applied for an annuity for 
which he paid MetLife $45,000.00 in return for monthly 
payments of $760.20 for five years.  Claypoole also 
purchased an annuity.  She paid ELCO $84,874.08 in return 
for monthly payments of $6,100.22 for 14 months.  Both 
contracts contained anti-assignment provisions.  One purpose 
of the ELCO annuity was to pay for Claypoole’s nursing 
home care during the period of Medicaid ineligibility that 
resulted from her large gifts to family members.  DHS 
considered both annuities “resources” in calculating a new 
penalty period of ineligibility. 
 
Connie Sanner entered a nursing home in March 2011 
without a community spouse.  In July 2011 she paid ELCO 
$53,700.00 in return for an annuity which paid her $4,499.17 
per month for 12 months.  Sanner had also made a large 
financial gift to her children which reduced her resources 
below the Medicaid limits and resulted in a period of 
Medicaid ineligibility.  The purpose of the annuity was to pay 
for Sanner’s nursing home care during that period of 
ineligibility.  As with Claypoole, DHS counted Sanner’s 
annuity as a “resource” in calculating a new penalty period of 
ineligibility. 
 
Claypoole and Sanner brought these 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
actions against DHS arguing that DHS acted illegally by 
counting the amount of their respective annuities as an 
available “resource” for purposes of Medicaid eligibility; 
their cases were consolidated by the District Court.  The 
plaintiffs and DHS filed cross motions for summary judgment 
and the District Court partially granted each party’s motion.  
The District Court held that the plaintiffs’ purchases of the 
short-term annuities were sham transactions intended only to 
shield resources from the calculation of Medicaid eligibility.  
Zahner ex rel. Zahner v. Mackereth, Civ. Action No. 11-306, 
2014 WL 198526, at *12-*13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014).  The 
District Court treated the annuities as trust-like instruments, 
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or transfers of assets for less than fair market value, and 
permitted DHS to count their cost as resources in calculating 
Medicaid eligibility.  Id. at *14. 
 
The District Court also ruled that a Pennsylvania 
statute that purported to make all annuities assignable was 
preempted by the federal Medicaid law because Congress 
specifically provided that, under certain circumstances, 
annuities are exempt from inclusion as an available resource 
for determinations of Medicaid eligibility.  Id. at *10.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, the value of any annuity held by the 
Medicaid applicant or his or her community spouse was 
considered a countable resource in determining if the 
applicant qualified for Medicaid assistance.  Accordingly, the 
District Court held that the nonassignability clause in 
Claypoole’s husband’s annuity with MetLife was valid and 
enforceable.  That annuity therefore complied with the 
applicable federal statute and could not be counted as a 
resource in determining Claypoole’s Medicaid eligibility.  
This appeal followed.2  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
 
We review a district court’s decision on summary 
judgment de novo.  See Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65 
(3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Allstate Settlement Corp. v. 
Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted).  Questions of statutory interpretation are 
also reviewed de novo.  See Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 
F.3d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Kaufman v. 
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citations omitted). 
 
A. WHEN DOES AN ANNUITY 
CONSTITUTE A “RESOURCE” FOR 
PURPOSES OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILTY? 
                                              
2 Two amici have filed briefs in support of the 
plaintiff-appellants.  Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance 
Company and the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, 
Incorporated filed briefs arguing that the annuities should not 
be counted as resources for Medicaid eligibility. 
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Pennsylvania participates in the federal Medicaid 
Program established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act 
(“the Medicaid Act”).  42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq.  Under the 
Medicaid Act, states receive federal funding to dispense 
assistance to qualified needy individuals.  “Congress has 
created a comprehensive system of asset-counting rules for 
determining who qualifies for Medicaid.”  Lewis v. 
Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 2012).  The rules are 
intended to limit Medicaid assistance to those deemed most in 
need of it, and to ensure that applicants’ spouses are not 
impoverished by the eligibility requirements.  Those 
eligibility requirements change with some regularity. 
 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”), Pub. L. 
109‐171, amended the Medicaid Act.  The provisions of the 
DRA that are relevant here establish the “appropriate means 
by which an individual or couple can reduce excess resources 
without incurring penalties [for purposes of Medicaid 
eligibility].”  Jeffrey A. Marshall, Matthew J. Parker, A Guide 
to Medicaid Annuities for Pennsylvania Lawyers at 4 (Nov. 
19, 2009), available at 
http://www.paannuity.com/pdf/guide_to_dra_annuities.pdf.  
Financial planning often involves the purchase of annuities.  
“The purchase of the annuity spends down a couple’s excess 
resources to the level required for the institutionalized spouse 
to become financially eligible for Medicaid/[Long-Term 
Care] benefits.”  Id. 
 
DHS oversees Pennsylvania’s Medicaid assistance in 
conjunction with federal regulations as Pennsylvania’s 
regulatory body charged with administering Medicaid 
assistance throughout the State.  The federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) has developed a 
State Medicaid Manual that assists states in interpreting the 
complex labyrinth of statutory and regulatory requirements 
that govern receipt of Medicare and Medicaid benefits.3  That 
manual “serves as the official [U.S. Health and Human 
                                              
3 In 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration 
became CMS.  See Statement of Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 
35437-03 (July 5, 2001). 
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Services Department (“HHS”)] interpretation of the 
[Medicaid] law and regulations[.]”  Pa., Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. HHS, 647 F.3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 2011).  The 
portion of the State Medicaid Manual relevant to our inquiry, 
concerning trusts and annuities, “is commonly referred to as 
‘Transmittal 64.’”  Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
685 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Health Care Fin. 
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., State 
Medicaid Manual 64 § 3258.11 (1994)).  
 
As explained at the outset, this dispute results from 
DHS’s decision to count Claypoole’s and Sanner’s annuities 
as resources in determining whether they qualified for 
Medicaid benefits.  The issue arose because Congress created 
a “safe harbor” pursuant to which, certain annuities are not 
considered resources for purposes of Medicaid eligibility.  
Therefore, the value of such annuities does not disqualify 
those otherwise eligible for Medicaid assistance from 
Medicaid eligibility.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii).  
We must determine if the disputed annuities here are within 
this safe harbor and therefore sheltered from inclusion in the 
plaintiffs’ assets. 
 
The DRA establishes a four-part test for determining 
whether an annuity is included within the safe harbor and thus 
not counted as a resource.  The annuity must (1) name the 
State as the remainder beneficiary, (2) be irrevocable and 
nonassignable, (3) be actuarially sound, and (4) provide for 
payments in equal amounts during the term of the annuity, 
with no deferral and no balloon payments.  Id.4  These 
                                              
4 The relevant section of § 1396p reads: 
[T]he term “assets” includes an annuity 
purchased by or on behalf of an annuitant who 
has applied for medical assistance with respect 
to nursing facility services or other long-term 
care services . . . unless . . . . the annuity . . . (I) 
is irrevocable and nonassignable; (II) is 
actuarially sound (as determined in accordance 
with actuarial publications of the Office of the 
Chief Actuary of the Social Security 
Administration); and (III) provides for 
payments in equal amounts during the term of 
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requirements apply to all annuities purchased on or after 
February 8, 2006, including the disputed annuities here. 
 
DHS first claims that the relatively short terms of these 
contracts disqualifies them from being “annuities.”  The DRA 
does not define “annuity.”  In 1995, the Supreme Court 
defined annuities for the purposes of determining whether a 
state’s comptroller had the authority to allow banks, in 
addition to insurance companies, to sell annuities.  
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 
513 U.S. 251 (1995).  NationsBank defined annuities as 
“contracts under which the purchaser makes one or more 
premium payments to the issuer in exchange for a series of 
payments, which continue either for a fixed period or for the 
life of the purchaser or a designated beneficiary.”  Id. at 254.  
The Supreme Court explained that “annuities are widely 
recognized as . . . investment products.”  Id. at 259 (citations 
omitted). 
 
DHS relies, in part, upon Mackey v. Dep’t of Human 
Servs., 289 Mich. App. 688 (2010), and Miller v. State Dep’t 
of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 275 Kan. 349 (2003), to argue that 
the plaintiffs’ annuities are not “annuities” under the DRA’s 
safe harbor.  In Mackey, the Court of Appeals of Michigan 
concluded that an “investment in a closely held L.L.C. 
rendered [a] transaction a transfer for less than fair market 
value.”  Mackey, 289 Mich. App. at 690.  The Court 
determined that an arrangement between relatives to facilitate 
Medicaid eligibility was not a transfer for fair market value 
due to its terms, not merely because of the intent to facilitate 
Medicaid eligibility.  However, Mackey is neither binding 
                                                                                                     
the annuity, with no deferral and no balloon 
payments made. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii); see also id. § 1396p(c)(1)(F) 
(explaining that annuities can be used to dispose assets if “the 
State is named as the remainder beneficiary . . . for at least the 
total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the 
institutionalized individual . . . .”).  See generally Morris, 685 
F.3d at 928 (“A separate provision states that an annuity is 
not treated as an available resource for purposes of Medicaid 
eligibility if the annuity meets certain requirements.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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authority, nor persuasive given the very different 
circumstances here.  Miller is equally unpersuasive, and also 
not binding.  There, the Kansas Supreme Court considered the 
effects of a support trust on Medicaid eligibility.5  The Court 
concluded that, although a support trust is an asset that is 
available to the Medicaid applicant, the principal balance was 
not available on the record before the Court.  Nevertheless, 
“for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility determination, 
[Miller] h[e]ld [that the Medicaid applicant] became a co-
settlor of her husband’s trust[]” because she would have been 
entitled to half of his estate if he had not put it in a trust 
because of their marriage.  Miller, 275 Kan. at 359.  
 
It is not disputed that each of the annuities here is a 
transfer of a sum of money in exchange for a series of 
payments, continuing for a fixed period.  NationsBank of 
N.C., N.A., 513 U.S. at 254.  As noted at the outset, Claypoole 
paid ELCO $84,874.08 to receive equal monthly payments of 
$6,100.22 over a 14-month term, while Sanner paid ELCO 
$53,700.00 for monthly payments of $4,499.17 over a 12-
month term. 
 
Nevertheless, DHS argues, and the dissent agrees, that 
the contracts are not annuities because they are not 
investment products, as recognized in NationsBank.  See 
generally id. at 259 (citations omitted).  DHS notes that 
Claypoole and Sanner each paid a broker a $1,000 start-up 
fee.  When that fee is added to the monthly return of each 
annuity, the cost of the annuity exceeds its return.  However, 
                                              
5 “A support trust exists when the trustee is required to 
inquire into the basic support needs of the beneficiary and to 
provide for those needs.”  Miller, 275 Kan. at 400 (citation 
omitted).  This is distinguished from a discretionary trust 
wherein the beneficiary has no legal right to require a trustee 
to use any part of the principal.  Rather, the trustee has 
complete authority to withhold trust assets from the 
beneficiary in the exercise of the trustee’s discretion and in 
the exercise of his or her fiduciary duties.  Since the assets of 
a support trust must be available to the beneficiary for his or 
her support needs, the assets in such a trust are routinely 
considered to be available to the beneficiary and therefore can 
affect the beneficiary’s eligibility for Medicaid assistance.  Id. 
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nothing in NationsBank requires that an instrument must 
provide a certain rate of return to qualify as an “annuity.”  In 
addition, NationsBank does not suggest that fees incurred in 
acquiring an annuity are considered in calculating the 
annuity’s return.  Nor does DHS (or the dissent) point us to 
authority suggesting that fees and costs must be taken into 
account in calculating the value received for a transfer in the 
form of an annuity.  The plaintiffs contend that the fee paid to 
a financial advisor is a cost entirely separate from the 
purchase price paid to the annuity company, especially when 
-- like a fee paid to an elder law attorney to develop a 
Medicaid eligibility plan -- such service helps ensure that the 
annuities purchased are Medicaid-compliant, and thus helps 
reduce the risk of litigation. Appellants Br. at 14 n.7.  
Furthermore, the statutes that control our inquiry do not 
require a positive rate of return as a prerequisite for being 
sheltered under the DRA safe harbor. 
 
The dissent is also concerned that “[t]he short payback 
period for the annuities . . . precluded any meaningful return 
from an investment standpoint.”  Dissent Op. at 1-2.  Yet, we 
see no reason why the relatively short-term of these 
instruments necessarily precludes viewing them as 
investments, and Congress has not foreclosed that 
possibility.6  
                                              
6 As an example, “Treasury bills, or T-bills, are a 
short-term investment in terms ranging from a few days to 26 
weeks.”  Dave Kansas, What is a Bond?, Wall St. J., 
available at http://guides.wsj.com/personal-
finance/investing/what-is-a-bond/.  See also Min Zeng and 
Katy Burne, Treasury Plans More Short-Term Debt, Wall St. 
J., May 6, 2015, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-plans-more-short-term-
debt-1430966689 (discussing the market for short-term loans 
and short-term investments, including “Treasury bills, which 
mature in a year or less[]”). 
We certainly do not suggest that annuities such as the 
ones in dispute here are on the same investment footing as 
government obligations.  Rather, we note the short term of the 
latter instruments only to underscore our point that the short 
term of an annuity should not preclude it from being 
considered an investment. 
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DHS next asks us to disallow any annuity that does not have a 
term of two years or more because Transmittal 64 uses the 
plural of “years” in its definition of an annuity.  Transmittal 
64 defines an annuity as “a right to receive fixed, periodic 
payments, either for life or a term of years.”  Transmittal 64, 
§ 3259.1(A)(9).  (Notably, this definition is similar to that in 
NationsBank.  513 U.S. at 254.)  DHS’s concern is that, if 
there is no floor, then the “the payback period timeframe” 
could be reduced to “contracts of two days, two hours, or 
even two seconds, and [still be] an ‘annuity.’”  Appellee Br. 
at 36.            
 
 Perhaps, as  DHS argues, annuities lasting only for 
hours or a few days would be  “sham transactions.”  Id. at 37 
(citing United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
It is, however, difficult to imagine such instruments gaining a 
foothold in the marketplace.  Moreover, annuities cannot be 
sold in Pennsylvania without first obtaining approval of the 
Commissioner of Insurance and we doubt that an annuity 
lasting two seconds, two hours, or two days would win 
approval.  See Herman v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 108 F.2d 
678, 682 (3d Cir. 1939) (“No annuity policy may be issued 
without the formal approval of the Insurance 
Commissioner[.]”). 
 
Other than DHS’s concern for hypothetical, two-
second annuities that are not before us, and the obvious 
problems they would create, DHS presents little else to 
support its tortured reading of Transmittal 64.  In contrast to 
DHS’s position, much of the authority the plaintiffs rely upon 
suggests that an annuity’s term has no floor at all.  See 
Appellants Reply Br. at 17 (“‘An annuity is a sum paid yearly 
or at other specific times in return for the payment of a fixed 
sum.’” (quoting POMS SI 00830.160(A)(1)) 7); id. at 5 
                                              
7 “POMS” refers to the Social Security Administration 
Program Operations Manual System.  “The POMS is relevant 
in determining the meaning of terms for Medicaid purposes 
because the Medicaid rules for evaluating resources may be 
no more restrictive than those for [the Supplemental Security 
Income program].”  Appellants Reply Br. at 17 n.3 (citing 42 
U.S.C § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(r)(2)(A), 
(B)). 
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(“‘Although annuities for the community spouse must be 
actuarially sound -- that is, they must pay out during the 
community spouse’s life expectancy -- and must name the 
state as a remainder beneficiary, there are no other limitations 
on the time period in which annuities must pay out.’” 
(emphasis added to original) (quoting U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Off., Medicaid: Fin. Characteristics of 
Approved Applicants & Methods used to Reduce Assets to 
Qualify for Nursing Home Coverage, at 32 (May 2014), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663417.pdf)).   
 
The resolution of this question turns largely on the 
meaning of “term of years” as used in Transmittal 64.  The 
tenth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines “term of 
years” as: 
1. A fixed period covering a precise 
number of years.  –  Also termed tenancy 
for a term.  2.  English law.  A fixed 
period covering less than a year, or a 
specified number of years and a fraction 
of a year. . . .  “In effect, ‘term of years’ 
seems to mean any term having a fixed 
and certain duration as a minimum.  
Thus, in addition to a tenancy for a 
specified number of years . . ., such 
tenancies as a yearly tenancy or a weekly 
tenancy are ‘terms of years’ within the 
definition, for there is a minimum 
duration of a year or a week respectively 
. . . .” 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1699 (10th ed. 2014) (quoting Robert 
E. Megarry & M.P. Thompson, A Manual of the Law of Real 
Property 74 (6th ed. 1993)).  The edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary in place when Transmittal 64 was published 
defines only “term for years,” and does so as “[a]n estate for 
years and the time during which such estate is to be held are 
each called a ‘term[.]’”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1470 (6th ed. 
1992) (emphasis in original).8  However, it fails to elaborate 
                                              
8 Notably, the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “annuity” with the same language as Transmittal 64.  
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on an “estate for years.”  The previous edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary defined an “estates for years” as “embrac[ing] all 
terms limited to endure for a definite and ascertained period, 
however short or long the period may be; they embrace terms 
for a fixed number of weeks or months or for a single year, as 
well as for any definite number of years, however great.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 492 (5th ed. 1981) (emphasis 
added).9 
 
We agree that a “term of years” is merely “a term of 
art[.]”  Appellants Br. at 18.  It requires that the contract last 
for some “definite period of time, as opposed to an indefinite 
term [or] for life.”  Id.  It thus stands in contrast to an 
indefinite period or an estate lasting for the duration of a 
person’s life.  The contracts here, lasting 12 and 14 months, 
fall within the legal meaning of a “term of years” as each 
contract permits multiple, periodic payments, over time, 
though not indefinitely, and not for a period that is 
coterminous with the annuitant’s actual life.  See generally 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A., 513 U.S. at 254, 259-60.  Clearly, 
if Congress intended to limit the safe harbor to annuities 
lasting two or more years, it would have been the height of 
simplicity to say so.  We will not judicially amend 
Transmittal 64 by adding that requirement to the requirements 
Congress established for safe harbor treatment.  Therefore, 
Claypoole’s and Sanner’s 14- and 12-month contracts with 
ELCO are for a term of years as is required by Transmittal 64. 
 
DHS also challenges the length of these annuities on 
the grounds that, even if the plaintiffs’ ELCO contracts are 
“annuities,” they are still too short to be actuarially sound and 
therefore cannot benefit from the safe harbor.  The dissent 
agrees. 
                                                                                                     
Compare Black’s Law Dictionary 90 (6th ed. 1992), with 
Transmittal 64, § 3259.1(A)(9). 
9 The phrase thus seems to connote an interest in 
property that is less than a fee simple interest, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 615 (6th ed. 1992) (“Typically, [the] words ‘fee 
simple’ standing alone create an absolute estate in [the] 
devisee[.]” (emphasis in original)), or life estate, id. at 924 
(“An estate whose duration is limited to the life of the party 
holding it, or some other person.”). 
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Congress did not require any minimum term for an 
annuity to qualify under the safe harbor.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G)(ii) (listing the requirements).  Rather, 
as noted above, the Medicaid Act limits the safe harbor to 
those annuities that are actuarially sound.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(G)(ii)(II).  Although the DRA does not define 
“actuarially sound,” Congress specified that assets must have 
a repayment term that is “actuarially sound (as determined in 
accordance with actuarial publications of the Office of the 
Chief Actuary of the Social Security Administration 
[(‘SSA’)).]”  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(I)(i).   
 
Transmittal 64 adds: “[i]f the expected return on the 
annuity is commensurate with a reasonable estimate of the life 
expectancy of the beneficiary, the annuity can be deemed 
actuarially sound.”  Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B) (emphasis 
added).  The “reasonable estimate of the life expectancy of 
the beneficiary” is determined using “life expectancy tables[] 
compiled [by] . . . the Office of the Actuary of the [SSA].”  
Id.  Transmittal 64 further explains that “[t]he average 
number of years of expected life remaining for the individual 
must coincide with the life of the annuity.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  This requirement prevents individuals from 
purchasing annuities that will pay out to their heirs after the 
annuitant dies and thus prevent the state from recouping 
assets to compensate for the Medicaid benefits the annuitant 
received.10 
                                              
10 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F) provides: 
[T]he purchase of an annuity shall be treated as 
the disposal of an asset for less than fair market 
value unless-- the State is named as the 
remainder beneficiary in the first position for at 
least the total amount of medical assistance paid 
on behalf of the institutionalized individual 
under this subchapter; or the State is named as 
such a beneficiary in the second position after 
the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if such 
spouse or a representative of such child 
disposes of any such remainder for less than fair 
market value. 
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Neither the “commensurate with” nor the “coincide 
with” standard specifies a minimum term for an annuity nor 
requires a minimum ratio to the annuitant’s actuarially 
determined life expectancy.  The plain text merely provides a 
simple example that states that if an annuity is for a term of 
10 years, it is not actuarially sound if the beneficiary’s 
reasonable life expectancy is 6.98 years, but it is actuarially 
sound if the beneficiary’s reasonable life expectancy is 14.96 
years.  Id.  It compares the beneficiary’s reasonable life 
expectancy with the term of the annuity, stating that when the 
term is shorter than the life expectancy, “the expected return 
on the annuity is commensurate with a reasonable estimate of 
the life expectancy of the beneficiary, [and] the annuity can 
be deemed actuarially sound.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Notably, it does not discuss just how much shorter the annuity 
can be and still be considered actuarially sound. 
 
The District Court concluded that these annuities 
satisfied Transmittal 64’s requirement because the plaintiffs’ 
“life expectancies were all greater than the terms of the 
annuities by a large margin[.]”  Zahner ex rel. Zahner, 2014 
WL 198526, at *12 (citation omitted).  It noted that “[i]n this 
case the Plaintiffs’ life expectancies ranged from six to ten 
years and the longest ELCO annuity was for a term of 18 
months.”  Id. (citation omitted).  It thus concluded that “the 
annuities may be considered actuarially sound . . . .”  Id. 
 
On appeal, DHS highlights the “reasonable estimate of 
the life expectancy” language in Transmittal 64 to assert that 
these annuities are too short to have any relationship to the 
life expectancies of these annuitants.  Appellee Br. at 40.  
While DHS and the dissent agree that Transmittal 64 imposes 
a maximum term for an annuity (the reasonable life 
expectancy of the annuitant), DHS and the dissent seek to 
impose a kind of floating floor for the minimum term for an 
annuity to be actuarially sound.  However, neither the DRA 
nor Transmittal 64 imposes one.  Transmittal 64 merely refers 
to actuarially sound in a manner that ensures that the term of 
                                                                                                     
 
Thus, the State is normally the first to take only if the 
annuitant has no direct descendants. 
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any annuity will not exceed the annuitant’s life expectancy.  
Accordingly, we conclude that any attempt to fashion a rule 
that would create some minimum ratio between duration of an 
annuity and life expectancy would constitute an improper 
judicial amendment of the applicable statutes and regulations.  
It would be an additional requirement to those that Congress 
has already prescribed and result in very practical difficulties 
that can best be addressed by policy choices made by elected 
representatives and their appointees. 
 
A given individual’s life expectancy may be far less 
(or far more) than that suggested by the statistical prediction 
reflected in actuarial tables.  This is exacerbated by the fact 
that the actuarial predictions in the SSA tables depend on 
only two variables: age and gender.  Id. at 37 n.8.  Such tables 
may well have predictive value when applied to a large 
number of individuals because demographic determinants of 
longevity are averaged over a large statistical sample.  
However, when applied to any given individual within that 
statistical universe, these generalized tables lose much of their 
predictive force because they ignore a variety of highly 
relevant factors, such as race, medical history, and income, 
which have been demonstrated to correlate with, and have an 
impact upon, longevity.  See, e.g., City of Los Angeles, Dep’t 
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) 
(“Actuarial studies could unquestionably identify differences 
in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as 
sex.”); United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 
1995) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[B]lack and [W]hite life 
expectancies differ greatly[.]”); see also Kathryn L. Moore, 
Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect 
on Women, Minorities, and Lower Income Workers, 65 Mo. 
L. Rev. 341, 368-74 (2000) (discussing various characteristics 
that impact life expectancy). 
 
Accordingly, “there is strategic decision making at the 
individual and subpopulation levels because demographic 
groups have different longevity rates and individuals can 
often assess their own longevity.”  Benjamin A. Templin, 
Social Security Reform: Should The Retirement Age Be 
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Increased?, 89 Or. L. Rev. 1179, 1199 (2011) (emphasis 
added) (footnotes omitted).11 
 
Claypoole’s situation exemplifies this and illustrates 
the inherent problems with judicial attempts to further limit 
the safe harbor with reference to the annuitant’s actuarial life 
expectancy.  Claypoole was 86 years old when she purchased 
a 14-month annuity.  Although she then had a “reasonable life 
expectancy” of over six more years according to the 
prescribed actuarial tables, Zahner ex rel. Zahner, 2014 WL 
198526, at *4, few people who reach the age of 86 could be 
faulted for measuring life expectancy in months rather than 
years and not assuming that they would live long enough to 
see their 92nd birthday.  Moreover, it is not for this court to 
decide if Claypoole’s decision to purchase an annuity that 
would only last for 14 months (rather than attempting to 
approximate the six years predicted by the SSA tables) was 
unreasonable in terms of her assumptions about her life 
expectancy. 
 
Despite actuarial predictions, Claypoole did not have 
six more years to live.  Rather, she died within two years of 
purchasing the contract -- only five months after her 14-
month annuity expired.  Appellants Br. at 20.  We therefore 
must respectfully disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that 
her annuity “[was] not remotely commensurate with [her] life 
expectanc[y].”  Dissent Op. at 3.  Her 14-month annuity was, 
in fact, far more commensurate with her actual life 
                                              
11 The longevity gaps by race and level of education 
have increased over time.  S. Jay Olshansky, et al., 
Differences In Life Expectancy Due To Race & Educational 
Differences Are Widening, & Many May Not Catch Up, 31 
Health Aff. 1803 (2012), available at 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/8/1803.full.pdf+ht
ml; see also James E. Duggan, Robert Gillingham, John S. 
Greenless, Mortality & Lifetime Income Evidence from Soc. 
Security Records, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Econ. Pol’y 
Res. Paper Series, at 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-
policy/Documents/rp2007-01.pdf (“Our results give strong 
empirical support to a negative relationship between 
individual lifetime income and mortality.”). 
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expectancy than the actuarial predictions contained in the 
SSA tables.  The short-term annuity that she purchased 
ensured that she would be able to enjoy the benefit of her 
annuity while minimizing the possibility that it would outlast 
her and, therefore, be considered as a transfer of wealth. 
 
We do not, of course, suggest that the statistical 
forecasts in actuarial tables must accurately reflect actual 
longevity of a given individual or that they must have some 
minimal level of accuracy before they can be relied upon.  
Such precision is not possible.  We merely conclude that the 
difficult policy decisions that are endemic in the kind of 
problem exemplified by the disputed terms of these annuities 
must be left to legislators and the administrators they appoint.  
This is particularly true here since a contrary result would 
force us to graft an additional requirement onto the Medicaid 
Act. 
 
The DRA and its regulations contain no other 
definition or example than one requiring that an annuity not 
be for a term that exceeds an annuitant’s reasonable life 
expectancy.  We therefore conclude that an annuity is 
actuarially sound for purposes of the safe harbor if its term is 
less than the annuitant’s reasonable life expectancy.  
Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B).12  This result is consistent with 
                                              
12 DHS relies on a North Dakota Medicaid state plan 
that adds an 85% life-expectancy requirement.  Appellee Br. 
at 41-42 (citing JA A273-76).  But, as the plaintiffs note, 
there is “no evidence that CMS ever approved the 
Pennsylvania policy in question[,]” like it did in North 
Dakota.  Appellants Reply Br. at 6.  Nor does CMS approval 
necessarily establish compliance with legal requirements.  
See, e.g., Geston v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 
2013) (striking down another aspect of North Dakota’s plan 
that held that the “North Dakota statute under which the 
annuity had been deemed countable violates and is preempted 
by federal Medicaid law.”).  In addition, even the example 
provided in Transmittal 64 would not have satisfied the North 
Dakota requirement because it is only two-thirds of the 
individual’s life expectancy -- far lower than 85%.  Thus, we 
find North Dakota’s requirement unpersuasive to analyzing 
the annuities in this case. 
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Transmittal 64 in that it discourages the purchase of annuities 
for terms that are so long that assets would pass to heirs and 
not be available to reimburse the State for the Medicaid 
assistance the annuitant received while alive.13  It also avoids 
drawing an arbitrary line that would determine if one’s own 
assessment of his or her life expectancy is reasonable.  Here, 
for example, although DHS and the dissent suggest that 
Claypoole’s annuity was for too short a period to be 
reasonably commensurate with her life expectancy, the term 
of that annuity was a much closer approximation of her 
longevity than was actuarially suggested. 
 
Here, the District Court concluded that these annuities 
were actuarially sound because they did not exceed the 
annuitant’s life expectancy.  It held that “the word 
commensurate indicates a reasonable relatedness of the term 
of the annuity to the beneficiary’s life expectancy.”  Zahner 
ex rel. Zahner, 2014 WL 198526, at *12.  However, it went 
further and concluded that these annuities should not be 
excluded from the plaintiffs’ resources because they did not 
pass the “sniff[]test.”  Id.  The District Court failed to cite 
authority for its imposition of a “reasonably related” 
requirement or for its “sniff test.”  Instead, it discussed the 
policy issues supporting that result.14  The District Court 
                                              
13 The National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, 
Incorporated, amicus to the plaintiffs, points out that CMS 
originally used the term “actuarially sound” in 1994 in order 
to address a concern that the annuity would be paid to 
someone other than the annuitant.  National Academy of 
Elder Law Attorneys, Inc. Br. at 4.  In order to prevent this, 
CMS devised that if the annuity’s term were shorter than the 
life expectancy of the beneficiary, the annuity would go to the 
beneficiary and not another party.  Id. at 4, 31.  The National 
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Incorporated argues that 
Congress took on this phrasing and meaning when it adopted 
the term “actuarially sound” in the DRA amendments.  Id. at 
30. 
 
14 The District Court failed to recognize countervailing 
policy considerations that weigh in favor of permitting short-
term annuities like the ones used in this case.  Shorter 
annuities make it possible for people with fewer assets to 
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reasoned that the key problem with these annuities is that they 
do not have “a scrupulous eye toward[] achieving a 
legitimate, non-shelter, purpose or at least have the 
appearance of such an investment.”  Id. at *13.15 
 
While Transmittal 64 acknowledges that annuities “are 
occasionally used to shelter assets so that individuals 
purchasing them can become eligible for Medicaid[,]” 
Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B), the policy it implements to 
address that problem does not focus on how short an 
annuity’s term can be, it focuses on the maximum term.  The 
publication states: “[i]n order to . . . capture those annuities 
which abusively shelter assets,” courts assess the “ultimate 
purpose[.]”  Id.  It then narrowly defines a negative “ultimate 
purpose” as the transfer of assets for less than fair market 
value, which occurs when “the individual is not reasonably 
expected to live longer than the guarantee period of the 
annuity[.]”  Id.  Thus, it reiterates a bright-line rule requiring 
qualifying annuities to be shorter than the beneficiary’s life 
expectancy.  That is a policy choice and we should not disturb 
it.16 
                                                                                                     
purchase annuities.  Being able to purchase an annuity for 
multiple years requires a large upfront cost that aging, low-
income individuals may not have access to.  See Appellants 
Br. at 19-20 & n.8; National Academy of Elder Law 
Attorneys, Inc. Br. at 19-20 & n.37, 24-25.  The need to 
exercise caution is even greater when adopting a particular 
policy that places those who are already disadvantaged in an 
even worse position vis-à-vis more affluent members of 
society -- especially because the text of the Medicaid Act 
does not support such a reading. 
 
15 Moreover, as an amicus notes, weaving such 
unguided subjectivity and discretion into the fabric of a 
highly regulated benefit, like Medicaid, by allowing the 
District Court’s “sniff test,” “is a recipe for a cash-strapped 
state with a delicate nose to deny otherwise deserving 
Medicaid applications on the grounds that it sniffed abuse.”  
Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. Br. at 25. 
 
16 This interpretation does not lead to the absurd result 
that DHS alleges based on its theoretical parade of horribles.  
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Thus, we do not believe that the annuitant’s motive is 
determinative.  See James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 219 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do not create rules based on our own sense 
of the ultimate purpose of the law being interpreted, but rather 
seek to implement the purpose of Congress as expressed in 
the text of the statutes it passed.” (citation omitted)).  
Although we are sympathetic to the concerns the dissent and 
DHS outline, Congress must resolve them.  Absent legislative 
change, it is clear that “Congress has not revised the Medicaid 
statute to foreclose this option.”  Morris, 685 F.3d at 928, 934 
(a case involving annuities purchased for non-
institutionalized spouses recognizing that “the district court’s 
concerns regarding the exploitation of what can only be 
described as a loophole in the Medicaid statutes[] [and] 
conclud[ing] that the problem can only be addressed by 
Congress.”).  “It is not the role of the court to compensate for 
an apparent legislative oversight by effectively rewriting a 
law to comport with one of the perceived or presumed 
purposes motivating its enactment.”  Mertz ex rel. Mertz v. 
Houstoun, 155 F. Supp. 2d 415, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (footnote 
omitted); see also Lewis, 685 F.3d at 351 (“[W]hile 
preventing abuse is a laudable goal and one with which 
Congress may agree, that requirement is not reflected in the 
Medicaid statute.”).  “Policy rationales cannot prevail over 
the text of a statute.”  Hughes v. McCarthy, 734 F.3d 473, 480 
(6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
Financial planning is inherent in the Medicaid scheme: 
annuities are not barred from the safe harbor, and the look-
back period that considers gifts as resources for purposes of 
Medicaid assistance is of limited duration.  Therefore, the 
definition of protected annuities is one best left to the 
policymakers in the legislative branch.   
 
                                                                                                     
First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 
198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly absurd results and 
‘the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions’ 
justify a limitation on the ‘plain meaning’ of the statutory 
language.” (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 
(1984))). 
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B. ARE THE ANNUITIES TRUSTS OR 
TRUST-LIKE?17 
 
To the extent that an annuity is “trust-like,” 
Transmittal 64 disallows the annuity from protection in the 
safe harbor and the annuity’s value can be treated as 
resources that can disqualify an applicant for Medicaid 
assistance.  See Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B).  DHS argues 
that these annuities should be treated as resources of the 
plaintiffs under this provision. 
 
Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B) states, in relevant part: 
[i]n order to avoid penalizing annuities validly 
purchased as part of a retirement plan but to 
capture those annuities which abusively shelter 
assets, a determination must be made with 
regard to the ultimate purpose of the annuity 
(i.e., whether the purchase of the annuity 
constitutes a transfer of assets for less than fair 
market value).  If the expected return on the 
annuity is commensurate with a reasonable 
estimate of the life expectancy of the 
beneficiary, the annuity can be deemed 
actuarially sound.  . . . 
If the individual is not reasonably expected to 
live longer than the guarantee period of the 
annuity, the individual will not receive fair 
market value for the annuity based on the 
projected return. 
                                              
17 Although we will conclude that the annuities are not 
trusts or trust-like, it is not clear that this is essential to our 
holding since we have already concluded that the annuities 
are in the safe harbor that Congress has defined.  The DRA 
directs that annuities “shall be treated as the disposal of an 
asset for less than fair-market value unless” the annuity meets 
the requirements, as we have concluded they do here.  42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F) (emphasis added); see also Fidelity 
& Guaranty Life Ins. Co. Br. at 14 (noting that Transmittal 64 
cannot supplant Congress’s express definition of the test for 
compliant annuities because “42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii) 
is the statutory test for determining whether any annuity is an 
abusive asset shelter.” (emphasis in original)). 
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Id.  However, DHS’s argument is circular because we have 
already explained why these annuities are actuarially sound 
and not a transfer of assets for less than fair market value.  
There are, however, other reasons to reject DHS’s attempt to 
define these annuities as trust-like. 
 
Congress provided that “[t]he term ‘trust’ includes any legal 
instrument or device that is similar to a trust but includes an 
annuity only to such extent and in such manner as the [HHS] 
Secretary specifies.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(6) (emphasis 
added).  We agree with the plaintiffs that, “because the 
Secretary to date has not so specified, it follows that [the 
plaintiffs’] annuities cannot be treated as trusts.”  Appellants 
Br. at 11.  In a brief that the HHS filed in the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the HHS explicitly stated that 
“the Secretary has not so specified.”  Brief for the Amicus 
Curiae U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Lopes v. Dep’t 
of Social Servs., 10-3741-cv, at *11, n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(emphasis added).  This rejection was made in 2011, after the 
DRA and Transmittal 64 were in existence.  See also Geston 
v. Anderson, 729 F.3d 1077, 1085 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
Secretary has not so specified[.]” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Although DHS acknowledges that Transmittal 64 
predates the Medicaid Act, it asserts that Transmittal 64 is 
still the Secretary’s reply to the statutory invitation to define 
when annuities are “trusts.”  Appellee Br. at 38-39; see 
Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B) (“Section 1917(d)(6) [42 U.S.C. 
1396p(d)(6)] provides that the term ‘trust’ includes an annuity 
to the extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies.  
This subsection describes how annuities are treated under the 
trust/transfer provisions.”). 
 
Transmittal 64 does not present any support for 
treating these annuities as trust-like devices.  As noted, it 
merely points back to the requirement that annuities must not 
be longer than an individual’s reasonable life expectancy, by 
adding a new requirement that the annuity cannot constitute 
“a transfer of assets for less than fair market value.”  Id.  
Transmittal 64 defines an annuity with a fair market value in 
the same way it defines actuarial soundness.  Given the text 
of the DRA and the language in Transmittal 64, these 
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annuities are actuarially sound for the reasons we have 
explained, just as the District Court found. 
 
Moreover, these annuities cannot be equated with 
trusts because there is nothing akin to a fiduciary relationship 
between the annuitants and ELCO.  Id., § 3259.1(A)(l) 
(defining a trust as “any arrangement in which a grantor 
transfers property to a trustee or trustees with the intention 
that it be held, managed, or administered by the trustee(s) for 
the benefit of the grantor or certain designated individuals 
(beneficiaries)[]”); see also id., § 3259.1(A)(2) (requiring “a 
grantor who transfers property to an individual or entity with 
fiduciary obligations”).  ELCO is not under any fiduciary 
obligation to wisely invest plaintiffs’ funds or even to 
preserve them as long as ELCO fulfills its contractual 
obligation to make regular monthly payments in the agreed 
amount for the term of the annuity.  See generally Appellants 
Br. at 12-13; Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. Br. at 4-5.  
ELCO’s duty to annuitants is purely contractual, it is not 
fiduciary.  Accordingly, we readily reject DHS’s attempt to 
have us view these annuities as some form of trust. 
 
C. IS PENNSYLVANIA’S ANTIASSIGNMENT 
PROVISION PREEMPTED? 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, all annuities are assignable.  
The relevant provision states: 
 
Any provision in any annuity . . . owned by an 
applicant or recipient of medical assistance[] . . 
. that has the effect of limiting the right of such 
owner to sell, transfer or assign the right to 
receive payments thereunder or restricts the 
right to change the designated beneficiary 
thereunder is void. 
 
62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 441.6(b).  Section 441.6(b), 
making annuities assignable by operation of law, applies to 
all annuities, regardless of who purchases them, either the 
Medicaid applicant who lives in a nursing home, like 
Claypoole or Sanner, or the community spouse, like 
Claypoole’s husband. 
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As we have explained, under the Medicaid Act, an 
annuity held by the Medicaid applicant counts as an asset for 
purposes of qualifying for Medicaid unless it meets certain 
requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G).  One 
requirement is that the annuity must not be assignable.  Id. § 
1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(I).  Further, although a community 
spouse’s resources can be counted in determining Medicaid 
eligibility, id. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A), a community spouse’s 
irrevocable, nonassignable annuities may not be treated as 
available resources.  James, 547 F.3d at 218-19. 
 
Thus, if § 441.6(b) controls, no Medicaid applicant or 
his or her spouse can exclude an annuity from being 
considered a resource for purposes of Medicaid eligibility 
because Pennsylvania makes all annuities assignable.  Section 
441.6(b) requires that all annuities are countable resources for 
the purposes of Medicaid eligibility determinations. 
 
The District Court held that the Medicaid Act 
preempted Pennsylvania’s statute and that the annuities had 
valid nonassignability clauses in compliance with the federal 
statute.  Zahner ex rel. Zahner, 2014 WL 198526, at *8.  On 
appeal, DHS argues that the federal law cannot preempt 
Pennsylvania’s law because §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F) and (G) do not 
create an impermeable safe harbor.  Appellee Br. at 31-33.  
Rather, according to DHS, federal law merely gives states the 
option of allowing annuities to be excluded, and Pennsylvania 
chose to not exercise that option by enacting § 441.6(b).  Id. 
at 32.  DHS also claims that our precedent mistakenly 
assumed that Pennsylvania generally allows anti-assignment 
provisions; and instead, Pennsylvania is able to clarify its 
public policy position against nonassignment clauses by 
enacting § 441.6(b).  Id. at 28 (citations omitted).18 
 
The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  The 
Supremacy Clause preempts any state law that “interferes 
                                              
18 Our review of this issue is de novo.  In re Federal-
Mogul Global, 684 F.3d 355, 364 n.16 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). 
26 
 
with or is contrary to federal law[.]”  Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 
663, 666 (1962) (citations omitted).  There are different forms 
of preemption, but all agree that this dispute implicates 
conflict preemption.  Conflict preemption occurs when it is 
impossible to comply with both the federal and state law.  
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).  “Conflict preemption nullifies 
state law inasmuch as it conflicts with federal law, either 
where compliance with both laws is impossible or where state 
law erects an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Farina v. 
Nokia, 625 F.3d 97, 115 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
States that elect to participate in the Medicaid program 
must comply with eligibility requirements set by the federal 
government.  The Medicaid Act permits states to establish 
eligibility requirements that are more liberal than those of the 
federal government, however states may not create more 
restrictive requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III).  
A state law is considered “no more restrictive” if “additional 
individuals may be eligible for medical assistance and no 
individuals who are otherwise eligible are made ineligible for 
such assistance.”  Id. § 1396a(r)(2)(B).  “[O]nce the state 
voluntarily accepts the conditions imposed by Congress, the 
Supremacy Clause obliges it to comply with federal 
requirements.”  Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 510 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Lewis, 685 F.3d at 332 
(“No State is obligated to join Medicaid, but if they do join, 
they are subject to federal regulations governing its 
administration.” (citation omitted)). 
 
“[E]very exercise of statutory interpretation begins 
with an examination of the plain language of the statute.  
Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
further inquiry is not required.”  Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 
274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  
Moreover, we must examine the totality of every statute and 
not unduly focus on some language to the exclusion of other 
statutory text.  Id. (“[W]hen interpreting a statute, courts 
should endeavor to give meaning to every word which 
Congress used and therefore should avoid an interpretation 
which renders an element of the language superfluous.” 
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(citations omitted)).  We also note that, “[i]n areas of 
traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute 
has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such 
an intention ‘clear and manifest.’”  Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (citations 
omitted); see also MD Mall Assocs., LLC v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., 715 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2013).  There is a presumption 
against preempting state law.  Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 
(citations omitted).  Our inquiry is therefore controlled by the 
text of the Medicaid Act pertaining to the assignability of 
annuities, to the extent that the language is not ambiguous. 
 
Congress clearly intended for some annuities to be 
considered resources for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility.  
However, it is equally clear that Congress did not intend that 
all annuities be considered.  It therefore established the 
criteria that would allow Medicaid applicants to purchase 
annuities without fear of becoming ineligible for Medicaid 
assistance.  One criterion Congress established for an annuity 
to not count as a Medicaid applicant’s resource is that it must 
be nonassignable.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G).  This 
affords some protection for the community spouse.  
“Congress sought to protect community spouses from 
pauperization while preventing financially secure couples 
from obtaining Medicaid assistance.  To achieve this aim, 
Congress installed a set of intricate and interlocking 
requirements with which States must comply in allocating a 
couple’s income and resources.”  Wisconsin Dep’t of Health 
& Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 480 (2002) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
Congress also declared that, with some exceptions, “no 
income of the community spouse shall be deemed available to 
the institutionalized spouse.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1).  
Irrevocable, nonassignable annuities are income streams, not 
countable as resources against the institutionalized spouse’s 
Medicaid eligibility.  James, 547 F.3d at 218-19; see also 
Geston, 729 F.3d at 1083; Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188-89; Morris, 
685 F.3d at 932-33; Vieth v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family 
Servs., 2009-Ohio-3748, at ¶ 34 (July 30, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, DHS invites us to read ambiguity into 
seemingly straightforward text and precedent by pointing to a 
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separate section of the DRA.  That section reads: “Nothing in 
this subsection shall be construed as preventing a State from 
denying eligibility for medical assistance for an individual 
based on the income or resources derived from an annuity 
described in paragraph (1)[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(4).   
DHS weaves an ambiguity into this provision by noting the 
DRA’s use of “subsection” instead of “section.”  Appellee Br. 
at 25-26. 
 
Section 1396p(e)(4) uses the term “subsection” in 
reference to subsection (e), which pertains to disclosure 
requirements.  Thus, according to DHS, § 1396p(e)(4) 
“literally states only that nothing in the disclosure 
requirements shall prevent a State from treating an annuity as 
a resource.”  Id.  To its credit, DHS acknowledges that this 
reading is “something of a non-sequitur since disclosure has 
nothing to do with whether an annuity is treated as a resource 
or not.”  Id at 26.  Nevertheless, DHS asserts “[s]ubparagraph 
(e)(4) demonstrates that Congress intended that States be able 
to treat annuities as resources under certain circumstances, 
but whether that authority extends to annuities exempt from 
transfer of asset treatment under §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F) and (G) is 
uncertain.”  Id. 
 
We agree that this reading is a non-sequitur and we 
disagree with DHS’s strained interpretation of the DRA.  We 
reiterate that these provisions of the Medicaid Act are “not 
ambiguous” and, “contrary to the [DHS]’s interpretation, § 
1396p(e)(4) cannot be regarded as a basis by which it may 
deny eligibility for benefits where the annuity otherwise 
complies with the law.”  Weatherbee ex rel. Vecchio v. 
Richman, 351 Fed. App’x 786, 787 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
When the Medicaid Act is read as a whole, Congress’s 
intent with respect to annuities is addressed clearly and 
consistently throughout.  As discussed above, with respect to 
Medicaid applicants, §§ 1396p(c)(1)(F) and (G) make clear 
that annuities with certain characteristics, including 
nonassignability clauses, are not assets to be counted as 
resources for their Medicaid eligibility.  Moreover, after 
reviewing the Medicaid Act and the Supplemental Security 
Income Program, we previously held that Congress intended 
to shield a community spouse’s annuity from calculation of 
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the institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid eligibility if the 
annuity is nonassignable and irrevocable.  James, 547 F.3d at 
218; see also Geston, 729 F.3d at 1083; Lopes, 696 F.3d at 
184-85. 
 
DHS seeks to undermine James by pointing out that 
(1) Congress passed the DRA after the annuities in James 
were purchased and added a half-a-loaf gifting prohibition 
and (2) Pennsylvania passed § 441.6(b) specifically seeking 
to undermine James in light of Pennsylvania’s public policy 
against restraints on alienation.  Appellee Br. at 28, 37-38.  
We find neither argument persuasive. 
 
As discussed above, the DRA outlines the 
requirements for annuities purchased by a person who is 
seeking Medicaid eligibility.  James, on the other hand, 
discusses annuities purchased by a community spouse.  
Moreover, all appellate courts that have discussed whether a 
community spouse’s nonassignable annuity is a countable 
resource toward the institutionalized spouse’s Medicaid 
eligibility have done so after changes to the DRA and have 
come to the same conclusion as James.  See Geston, 729 F.3d 
at 1083; Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188-89; Morris, 685 F.3d at 932-
33; Vieth, 2009-Ohio-3748, at ¶ 34. 
 
More fundamentally, Pennsylvania cannot enact 
legislation that changes federal law (or binding judicial 
interpretation of federal law) with respect to annuities.  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  In Geston, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained, “[i]f the State’s 
public policy requires it to count as resources certain 
annuities that federal law excludes from the scope of 
resources that may be considered in making eligibility 
determinations, then the State’s methodology is more 
restrictive than the federal methodology.”  Id. 729 F.3d at 
1085-86 (citation omitted).19 
                                              
19 DHS mistakenly interprets Geston v. Anderson as 
supporting its position on preemption.  Geston held that § 
1396p(e)(4) “maintained the status quo[,]” and merely 
“clarifies that the new disclosure provisions do not restrict a 
State’s authority to deny eligibility on the basis of an annuity 
where the State otherwise has authority to do so.”  729 F.3d at 
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The Medicaid Act cannot reasonably be read to 
support DHS’s contention that Congress intended to make 
protection of annuities optional.  See generally United States 
v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1087 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts should 
disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language 
superfluous.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Moreover, the argument here is akin to the dispute that 
we resolved in Lewis v. Alexander.  There, we held that the 
Medicaid Act preempted parts of Section 9 of the 
Pennsylvania Act of 2005, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1414, which 
sought to add Medicaid eligibility requirements for special 
needs trusts.  685 F.3d at 331.  We explained that the 
Medicaid Act is a “complex and comprehensive system of 
asset-counting rules[]” in which “Congress rigorously dictates 
what assets shall count and what assets shall not count toward 
Medicaid eligibility.”  Id. at 344.  Lewis rejected DHS’s 
myopic attempts to create a gap in the Medicaid Act within 
which, states were free to legislate.  We said: “focusing solely 
on the words ‘[t]his subsection’ has caused [DHS] . . . to miss 
the forest for the trees.”  Id. at 343.  Because Congress has 
“actually legislated on th[e] precise class of asset[]” at issue, 
id. at 344 (emphasis in original), further limitations from the 
state are preempted.  No meaningful distinction can be drawn 
between the “rigorous system” of legislating trusts in Lewis, 
and the equally rigorous attempts to define when annuities 
can be considered for Medicaid eligibility.  Thus, “it seems 
clear that Congress intended to create a purely binary system 
of classification: either a trust[, or, in this case, an annuity,] 
affects Medicaid eligibility or it does not.”  Id. at 344.  
Pennsylvania may not create more restrictive requirements.  
42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i)(III). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                                                                     
1084.  The Court looked at the entirety of the statute and held: 
“where other provisions of law define annuity benefits as 
unearned income, § 1396p(e)(4) did not authorize States to 
recharacterize those benefits as resources.”  Id.  That is 
precisely what DHS seeks to do here. 
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For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
order of the District Court in part, and affirm the order in part. 
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ZAHNER v. SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA 
DEPARMENT HUMAN SERVICES 
 
Nos. 14-1328 and 14-1406 
 
          
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
             
I would affirm the District Court’s ruling on the 
grounds that the annuities that Sanner and Claypoole 
purchased were not purchased for an investment purpose, but, 
rather, were purchased in order to qualify for benefits.  In 
addition, they were not actuarially sound.  Therefore, they 
should be counted as resources for the purpose of the 
Medicare eligibility determination as outlined in the DRA.  
  
The State Medicaid Manual “serves as the official 
HHS interpretation of the law and regulations.”  Pa. Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 647 
F.3d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 2011).  It specifically recognizes that 
annuities “are occasionally used to shelter assets so that 
individuals purchasing them can become eligible for 
Medicaid.”  Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B).  The Manual 
mandates that “a determination must be made with regard to 
the ultimate purpose of the annuity (i.e., whether the purchase 
of the annuity constitutes a transfer of assets for less than fair 
market value).”  Id.  We cannot ignore that language, and 
must therefore consider whether the annuities here were 
investments.  Thus, I take issue with the majority’s statement 
that motive is not determinative.  It is an essential 
consideration.  I conclude that the annuities were not 
investments.  The short payback period for the annuities 
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purchased by Sanner and Claypoole, 12 months and 14 
months, respectively, precluded any meaningful return from 
an investment standpoint.  Furthermore, when the broker fees 
are included, the transactions actually lost money.1  In other 
words, as DPW argues, these annuities “had no economic 
purpose other than qualifying plaintiffs for [Medicaid] 
benefits.”  (DPW Br. at 21.)  The majority asserts that nothing 
requires annuities to be investment vehicles, but, indeed, that 
is their legitimate, common sense purpose.  The majority even 
notes that they are “widely recognized” as “investment 
products.”  (Majority Op. at 8 (quoting NationsBank of N.C., 
N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 259 
(1995)).  But these annuities were not investment products. 
 
Aside from the lack of investment purpose, these 
annuities also were not actuarially sound.  As the majority 
notes, Congress indicated that an annuity will fit within the 
“safe harbor” if, inter alia, “the annuity . . . is actuarially 
sound (as determined in accordance with actuarial 
publications of the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social 
Security Administration).”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(II).  The State Medicaid Manual 
provides that “[i]f the expected return on the annuity is 
commensurate with a reasonable estimate of the life 
expectancy of the beneficiary, the annuity can be deemed 
actuarially sound. . . . The average number of years of 
                                              
1 Even without the fees, the $290.04 “return” on Sanner’s 
investment of $53,700 and the $526.20 “return” on 
Claypoole’s investment of $84,874.08 represent an annual 
rate of return on each annuity of approximately .05%, a 
miniscule return.  (Appellants’ Br. 14.)   
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expected life remaining for the individual must coincide with 
the life of the annuity.”  Transmittal 64, § 3258.9(B) 
(emphasis added).  Essentially, the Manual indicates that an 
annuity is “actuarially sound” when the individual’s life 
expectancy is “commensurate with” or “coincide[s] with” the 
annuity term.  Neither Sanner nor Claypoole had annuities 
with terms that coincided with or were commensurate with 
their life expectancies.  In Sanner’s case, her annuity term 
was 10.55% of her life expectancy and Claypoole’s annuity 
term was 17.23% of her life expectancy.  These percentages 
are not remotely commensurate with their life expectancies.  
We need not opine as to what percentage of life expectancy 
would be sufficient to satisfy this test, but these percentages 
clearly miss the mark. 
 
The majority concludes that an annuity with a term 
that is less than the annuitant’s life expectancy passes the 
actuarial soundness test.  I disagree.  If Congress simply 
wanted to require the annuity terms to be shorter than life 
expectancy, it could have expressly stated that.  Instead, 
Congress said that annuities must be actuarially sound, and 
the State Medicaid Manual defines that term as meaning that 
annuities must be commensurate with or coincide with life 
expectancy.  Those words must mean something.  Moreover, 
the “commensurate with” requirement makes sense from a 
policy standpoint.  If an annuity term exceeds life expectancy, 
then it is clearly an attempt to transfer assets to others without 
facing Medicaid penalties.  And similarly, an annuity that is a 
tiny fraction of life expectancy has no investment purpose and 
operates only to shield assets.  Thus, actuarial soundness is 
the proper test to avoid both these undesirable situations, by 
requiring the term to be commensurate with life expectancy.   
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Because I would hold that the annuities were not for a 
legitimate economic purpose and were not actuarially sound, I 
would not reach the question of whether the provision of 
Pennsylvania law regarding non-assignability, § 441.6(b), is 
preempted. 
 
Accordingly, I must disagree with the majority and 
would affirm.    
